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COMMENTS
THE KELO THRESHOLD: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
PUBLIC USE RECONSIDERED
"The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all
the forces of the Crown. It may be frail-its roof may
shake-the wind may blow through it-the storm may
enter-the rain may enter-but the King of England
cannot enter!-all his force dares not cross the threshold
of the ruined tenement!"'
-William Pitt, the Elder, Earl of Chatham
"I thought I bought this place. But I guess I just leased it,
until the city wants it. "
-- Jim Saleet, an Ohio resident
whose home was to be condemned
I. INTRODUCTION
Susette Kelo was a homeowner in New London, Connecticut.3
The neighborhood in which she lived-Fort Trumbull-was
peaceful; from the front porch of her old salmon-colored Victorian
home, Mrs. Kelo could look out onto the Thames River and watch
ferries slowly crawling across the horizon.4 Fort Trumbull may
1. William Pitt, the Elder, Earl of Chatham, Speech in the House of Lords (1763), in
RESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS REQUESTED FROM THE CON-
GRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 165 (Suzy Platt ed., 1989).
2. 60 Minutes: Eminent Domain: Being Abused?, CBS NEWS, July 4, 2004 [hereinaf-
ter 60 Minutes], available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/09/26/60minutes/main
575343.shtml (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
3. Carrie Budoff, A Battle Against Eminent Domain; Gritty Dispute in New London,
HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 1, 2001, at Al.
4. Id.
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not have been luxurious, but it was Susette's home-until she
was confronted with eviction. Nailed to her door on the day before
Thanksgiving, a notice of condemnation had been issued by the
City of New London.5 Mrs. Kelo's property-as well as the proper-
ties of many other Fort Trumbull residents-was to be cleared to
make way for New London's recently adopted economic develop-
ment strategy.6 Among other things, this plan envisioned the con-
struction of a riverfront hotel, offices, and luxury condominiums
on land that was then occupied by private homes and businesses.7
The Fort Trumbull residents were not consulted; they were sim-
ply given the choice either to leave willingly or to be forced out.'
The City of New London attempted to justify its condemnations
by claiming authority under eminent domain.9 Eminent domain
describes the power of governments to take property owned by
private citizens for public use. ' ° In the United States, that power
is wielded not only by the federal government," but also by the
government of each state.'2 While sweeping, the breadth of power
animating eminent domain is not without limitation. The United
States Constitution provides that the government shall not de-
prive any person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation." 3
5. Laura Mansnerus, Ties to a Neighborhood at Root of Court Fight; New London
Residents Challege City Plans, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2001, at B5.
6. Dana Berliner, You Can't Go Home Again, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 11, 2004, at 42.
7. Id.
8. See Mansnerus, supra note 5.
9. Brief of the Respondents at 1-2, Kelo v. City of New London, - U.S. __ (2005)
(No. 04-108) [hereinafter Respondents' Briefi.
10. See 13 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 79F.02 (Michael Allan
Wolfed., 2000).
11. E.g., Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1876).
12. E.g., Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480 (1924) ("The power of emi-
nent domain is an attribute of sovereignty, and inheres in every independent State.").
From this point forward, the general use of the word "government" is intended to include
both the state and federal levels of government.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Although the Fifth Amendment applies directly only
against the federal government, many of its provisions have been incorporated against the
states via the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that no state may "deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Included among
the incorporated provisions is the Takings Clause. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978) (articulating a Takings Clause issue). With respect to
exercises of eminent domain, then, the maximum scope of the authority of the federal gov-
ernment to exercise its power of eminent domain is coterminous with that of the several
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For much of America's constitutional history, exercises of emi-
nent domain were not terribly controversial.14 When the power
was used, its purpose was generally for the appropriation of land
for roads, dams, or other structures of general public utility. 5
During the twentieth century, however, governments began to
employ eminent domain for purposes whose public utility was
strained, if not tenuous. 6 This trend has continued until the pre-
sent, and it is now a rather routine occurrence for the homes and
businesses of private citizens to be claimed by the government
and transferred to private entities in pursuit of a more efficient
use of the land. 7
Turning back to New London, many of those who received no-
tices of condemnation voluntarily sold their property.'" Mrs. Kelo
and several others, however, refused to sell.'9 These obstinate few
denied the authority of New London to condemn privately owned
property for use by another private-and wealthier-citizen and
resorted to the courts for the protection of their rights. Recently,
the Fort Trumbull residents presented their case before the Su-
preme Court of the United States.2"
states.
14. See 13 POWELL, supra note 10, § 79F.03[1], at 79F-25.
15. Id.
16. In Cincinnati, for example, the local government condemned a Walgreens phar-
macy for the construction of a Nordstrom department store. The city then condemned a
CVS pharmacy to relocate Walgreens, and then condemned several smaller private busi-
nesses to relocate the CVS. The Nordstrom was never built, and the site of the former
Walgreens became an empty parking lot. DANA BERLINER, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, PUBLIC
POWER, PRIVATE GAIN: A FVE-YEAR, STATE BY STATE REPORT EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 160-61 (2003), available at http://www.castlecoalition.org/report/
pdfJED report.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2005); see 13 POWELL, supra note 10, §§
79F.03 [3] [b] [iii]-[3] [c], at 79F-30 to 79F-33.
17. In the five-year period between 1998 and 2002, one organization estimated that
there were approximately 10,000 episodes of redevelopment condemnations in the United
States perpetrated by either a state or federal government. BERLINER, supra note 16, at 2.
Some governments go so far as to advertise in local newspapers that land will be con-
demned for developers who choose to build in certain locales. Laura Mansnerus, Refusing
to Let Go, Property Owners Test Eminent Domain's Limits, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2001, at
B1.
18. See Mansnerus, supra note 17.
19. David M. Herszenhorn, Residents of New London Go to Court, Saying Project Puts
Profit Before Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2000, at B5; Mansnerus, supra note 5.
20. Oral arguments in Kelo v. City of New London, No. 04-108, were presented on
February 22, 2005. Supreme Court of the United States, Argument Calendar: Session Be-
ginning February 22, 2005 (Dec. 15, 2004), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
oral-arguments/argument-calendars/monthlyargumentcalfebruary2005.pdf (last visited
Apr. 2, 2005).
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To those whose private property is condemned for efficiency's
sake, eminent domain is flatly repugnant to the ideals and aspi-
rations bound within the notion of the "American Dream."
Though that dream is important,21 there is a great deal more at
stake in Kelo v. City of New London.22 Because of the extensive
scope of the modern governmental authority to exercise eminent
domain, Kelo's importance touches every American landowner.
Because of the relationships implicated-those among individu-
als, their property, and their government-Kelo concerns nothing
less than the foundational principles of our Republic.
This piece has been organized around the purposes for which it
was written. Part II attempts to more thoroughly set forth the
facts and circumstances giving rise to Kelo in order to frame the
controversy accurately. Although New London's attempted con-
demnations may seem egregious, they are not irrational. In fact,
New London had compelling reasons for exercising eminent do-
main over Fort Trumbull, though Mrs. Kelo certainly had her
own compelling reasons for refusing to comply with the city's eco-
nomic development plan. In addition, Part II will also discuss the
pervasiveness of such economic development strategies in the
United States in order to demonstrate the pressing need for im-
mediate judicial intervention.
Part III will briefly explore the role of property in America's
constitutional heritage. This section will begin by philosophically
approaching the importance of private property to the sustenance
of a durable society. It will then move to examine the foundation
and extent of eminent domain in the early Republic. Part III will
21. Indeed, it is very important to understand the litigants' motivation in protecting
their properties, as it is most certainly their ardent desire to live free from undue and-
what must doubtlessly seem to the petitioners-unfair governmental interference. In the
words of the Connecticut trial judge, "[t]he plaintiffs wish to live out the typical American
dream of abiding and owning in peace homes and property that they have chosen. Any
threat to that dream is understandably forcefully and emotionally opposed as it should be
in a free society." Kelo v. City of New London, No. 557299, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 789,
at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002) (emphasis added). The "Petitioners do not want
money or damages. They only seek to stop the use of eminent domain so they may hold on
to their most sacred and important of possessions: their homes." Brief of Petitioners at 2,
Kelo v. City of New London, __ U.S. - (2005) (No. 04-108) [hereinafter Petitioners'
Brief]. As Mrs. Kelo has explained: "'My house isn't for sale.... It's my private property.'"
Budoff, supra note 3. '"I just want to be left alone.'" Mansnerus, supra note 5.
22. __ U.S. - (2005). At the time of publication, the Supreme Court of the United
States had not yet issued an opinion in Kelo.
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conclude by considering the status of eminent domain as it exists
under the Supreme Court's modern jurisprudence.
With these factual and legal considerations established, Part
IV will forecast the Supreme Court's decision in Kelo, first under
the existing analytical framework, then through the application
of an alternative standard. Indeed, the ultimate conclusion of this
article is that Kelo will deliver a limitation upon the ability of
governments to exercise eminent domain and rein in what has
become a nearly unfettered power to condemn private property.
II. KELO IN DEPTH
A. Our Town Redux: New London, Connecticut
New London is a small Connecticut town situated at the con-
fluence of the Thames River and Long Island Sound.23 For the
past several decades, the city has suffered from severe social and
economic distress.24 While its population has waned annually
since 1970, the unemployment rate over the same period has sur-
passed that of both the state and the region.2" The market for the
construction of new homes and businesses has meanwhile re-
mained virtually nonexistent.26
As early as 1978, it had already become apparent to the city's
leadership that only deliberate action could stave off New Lon-
don's total economic collapse.27 With this disastrous scenario in
mind, the city commissioned the New London Development Cor-
poration ("NLDC" or "development corporation"), an organization
whose primary function would be to advise city officials about
economic development opportunities available to the municipal-
ity.28 Despite the development corporation's creation, though, the
following decades remained just as socially and economically
stagnant.29
23. See Budoff, supra note 3.
24. See Respondents' Brief, supra note 9, at 2.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1-2.
27. See id. at 1.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 1-3.
2005] 1283
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Then in 1996, New London was dealt one of its most grievous
economic blows.3" The United States Naval Undersea Warfare
Center permanently ceased operations, costing New London
nearly 1500 jobs.3 This single loss, combined with decades of a
poorly performing economy and general commercial stagnation,
prompted the Connecticut Office of Planning and Management to
classify New London-in an undoubtedly generous understate-
ment-as a "distressed municipality."32
With the city's economic stability foundering, the NLDC as-
sumed with renewed vigor its mandate to attract investors and
spur development. It immediately began planning for a large-
scale economic development project in the Fort Trumbull
neighborhood of New London.33 The NLDC targeted Fort Trum-
bull because of its especially poor economic performance.34
Though Fort Trumbull is not a large area, consisting only of ap-
proximately ninety acres, it was among the most economically
depressed in all of New London. The tax revenue generated by
this neighborhood was, as of the last accounting, a mere
$325,000, or slightly more than $3,600 per acre.36 A study of prop-
erty demographics conducted in Fort Trumbull revealed that
many of its structures were vacant,37 that the quality of most
residential structures was below average,38 and that more than
30. See id. at 2.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted). According to the Connecticut Code, a
distressed municipality is one that meets certain "quantitative physical and economic dis-
tress thresholds" as determined by the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 32-9p(b) (West 2003). These criteria include the
degree of economic distress as measured by "the extent of growth lag, the extent of pov-
erty, and the adjusted age of housing" in the region. 42 U.S.C. § 5318(d)(1)(A) (2000). Con-
necticut also takes special cognizance of municipalities "adversely impacted by a major
plant closing, relocation or layoff' in applying "distressed" status. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 32-9p(b) (West 2003).
33. Respondents' Brief, supra note 9, at 1.
34. See id. at 1-4.
35. See id. at 2-4.
36. Id. at 3. The amount of tax revenue generated per acre may be artificially low,
though, due to the fact that fifty-four percent of the property in New London was not sub-
ject to taxation. Id. at 1.
37. Id. at 3 ("[Regarding the Fort Trumbull area itself, there was] [a]n 82 percent va-
cancy rate for non-residential buildings and a 20 percent rate for non-commercial prop-
erty.")
38. Id. ("[L]ess than twelve percent of the residential buildings were in average or bet-
ter condition.").
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half of all structures were built before 1950."9 Given that Fort
Trumbull's plight was generally shared by the city in common,4 °
New London certainly appeared to be "a city desperate for eco-
nomic rejuvenation."4'
Beginning in January 1998, the economic stimulus New Lon-
don so urgently needed began to arrive. Responding to New Lon-
don's efforts to combat its status as a distressed municipality, the
Connecticut State Bond Commission issued bonds whose proceeds
would support urban planning initiatives in Fort Trumbull, such
as the drafting and implementation of an economic development
plan.42 From the beginning of the redevelopment efforts, Fort
Trumbull was seen as the nerve-center of New London's economic
revitalization potential.4 As one of the most economically de-
pressed neighborhoods in a commercially stagnant municipality,
Fort Trumbull's renovation would doubtless engender a ripple of
prosperity benefiting the entire city.44 To that end, the NLDC was
directed to use the funds raised by the bond sales for property ac-
quisitions in the Fort Trumbull neighborhood.45
The following month, the city received its most promising eco-
nomic news in decades. Pfizer Corporation, the renowned global
leader in pharmaceutical development, announced that it would
construct a 750,000-square-foot research and development head-
quarters in New London.46 Pfizer's project, which was expected to
cost $270 million, consisted of three office towers situated on a
twenty-two acre campus. In addition, Pfizer anticipated a $200
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2 ("Sixty-one percent of the city's housing was built before 1950, with a high
percentage of vacant housing.").
41. Id. at 3. Despite New London's economic distress, though, it has never been con-
tended by either the City of New London nor the development corporation that the mu-
nicipality was blighted. See Petitioners' Brief, supra note 21, at 6-7; see also Mansnerus,
supra note 5.
42. See Kelo v. City of New London, No. 557299, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 789, at *5-
6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002).
43. See Respondents' Brief, supra note 9, at 1-4. As discussed previously, New London
was in the midst of tremendous economic stagnation, and Fort Trumbull was among the
most stagnant areas of the city. The Respondents state that "the NLDC considered six pos-
sible plans of action for the Fort Trumbull area." Id. at 6 (emphasis added). There is no
discussion or mention of whether neighborhoods other than Fort Trumbull were seriously
considered by the NLDC for such targeted economic development.
44. See Mansnerus, supra note 5.
45. Kelo, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 789, at *5-6.
46. Robert A. Hamilton, Counting on Pfizer?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2001, at 14CN1.
47. See Eleanor Charles, In the Region/Connecticut; Eminent Domain Challenged in
20051 1285
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million annual payroll that would support the creation of 2100
permanent jobs.4" The site of this project was New London Mills,
an area adjacent to Fort Trumbull that had for years been little
more than an abandoned and heavily-polluted industrial com-
plex.49 Pfizer's development initiative reinvigorated the demand
for property in this once-dilapidated area of New London and
sparked renewed interest in the peripheral realty.5 °
With the momentum gained from Pfizer's announcement, the
New London City Council began devoting much of its attention to
economic development and urban revitalization. In April 1998,
the council authorized the creation of a municipal development
plan ("MDP") for the Fort Trumbull neighborhood."' This de-
manded nothing less than a careful analysis of all the geographic,
environmental, economic, and social ramifications that could
likely result as a consequence of the city's adoption of a particular
developmental strategy.52 Rather than supervise the analyses
comprising the MDP itself, though, the council delegated over-
sight to the NLDC.53 As part of its mandate, the development cor-
poration arranged a series of informal meetings for the residents
of Fort Trumbull to educate them about the process of urban re-
development. 4 Meanwhile, the State Bond Commission appropri-
ated additional funds for use by the NLDC in carrying out its de-
velopmental mandate. 5
In January 2000, the MDP was completed and subsequently
adopted by the city council. 6 The developmental strategy it pre-
sented was ambitious; the NLDC proposed to create "a world-
class development that [would] complement the undertakings of
Pfizer."57 Fort Trumbull's 90 acres had originally consisted of ap-
New London Project, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2001, at 11-9; Hamilton, supra note 46.
48. Hamilton, supra note 46.
49. See Kelo, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 789, at *6; Hamilton, supra note 46.
50. See Hamilton, supra note 46. But see id. ("Not everyone is convinced that the
Pfizer effect is transforming New London.... [A] real estate broker with U.S. properties in
New London ... said she knew of only two businesses that had moved in as a direct result
of Pfizer.").
51. Respondents' Brief, supra note 9, at 4.
52. Id. at 5.
53. See id. at 4-6.
54. Id. at 4.
55. Kelo v. City of New London, No. 557299, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 789, at *6
(Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002).
56. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 21, at 3.
57. Mansnerus, supra note 17.
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THE KELO THRESHOLD
proximately 115 parcels of land, upon which were situated 85 pri-
vate homes and businesses." The MDP divided the acreage into
seven parcels.59 One was to be developed as a waterfront hotel
and conference center; another parcel would contain eighty new
town houses and apartments; three others were intended for ad-
ditional office or research and development space.6 ° Redeveloping
Fort Trumbull would also create thousands of additional jobs. The
NLDC estimated that the Fort Trumbull project would generate
between 1700 and 3200 new jobs in addition to the 2100 jobs cre-
ated by Pfizer.61 Fort Trumbull's redevelopment would also allow
the city to collect substantially more tax revenue-up to $1 mil-
lion more-than what it was presently receiving." To say the
least, the advantages of renovating Fort Trumbull would not be
inconsequential.
Nor was the MDP founded upon merely wistful speculation.
With Pfizer's heavyweight presence, the NLDC had little diffi-
culty attracting other prospective developers.63 In fact, by the end
of 2001, the City of New London and the NLDC had entered into
serious negotiations with Corcoran Jennison, a prominent Bos-
ton-based real estate development firm.64 Under the terms of the
negotiations, Corcoran Jennison would exclusively develop sev-
eral of the Fort Trumbull parcels.65 In exchange, Corcoran Jenni-
son would be allowed to lease those parcels from the NLDC for $1
each year for the next ninety-nine years.66
58. See Petitioners' Brief, supra note 21, at 3; Budoff, supra note 3.
59. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 21, at 3.
60. Respondents' Brief, supra note 9, at 6-7; Charles, supra note 47. At the time of the
MDP's adoption, two of the seven parcels were assigned nondescript uses. See Respon-
dents' Brief, supra note 9, at 7. One was for "park support," and the other for "water-
dependent commercial uses." Id.
61. See Respondents' Brief, supra note 9, at 8. The MDP predicted that Fort Trum-
bull's renovation would create between 518 and 867 construction jobs, 718 and 1362 direct
jobs, and 500 and 940 indirect jobs. Id.
62. Id. As mentioned previously, Fort Trumbull was then generating approximately
$325,000 of tax revenue annually. Id. at 3. The MDP, however, projected that a rejuve-
nated and commercially vibrant Fort Trumbull could generate between $680,544 and
$1,249,843 in tax revenue. Id. at 8.
63. See Hamilton, supra note 46 ("'Everybody's looking to do something in New Lon-
don, because you're going to have all these high-income people working at Pfizer and ei-
ther living in the city or driving to it every day.'") (quoting Ernest Hewitt, former mayor of
New London).
64. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 21, at 6.
65. Id.
66. Id. Pfizer received a similar arrangement from the city council in choosing New
20051 1287
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New London's developmental strategy was sound, though not
flawless. Chief among its defects was the obvious fact that, at the
time of the MDP's adoption, the city did not own Fort Trumbull's
ninety acres. 67 In order to proceed with its plan for economic revi-
talization, New London had to first acquire the land it needed
from Fort Trumbull's home and business owners.68 To that end,
the city council formally authorized the NLDC to begin property
acquisitions in January 2000.69
By that time, however, the NLDC had already been acquiring
Fort Trumbull property covertly.7" Many residents and business
owners had been approached by real estate agents who, on behalf
of an unidentified buyer, had offered to purchase their proper-
ties.71 Some occupants accepted the offers immediately; others re-
luctantly accepted when they were informed that the city could
take their property regardless of their consent.72 In less than one
year, the NLDC had acquired most of the property needed to im-
plement the MDP.73
Several Fort Trumbull property owners, however, would not
sell.74 The NLDC eventually came to realize that no amount of
negotiation or money could convince these obstinate few to re-
lent.75 In October 2000, the NLDC elected to begin acquiring the
property of the Fort Trumbull hold-outs through eminent do-
main.76 Notices of condemnation were then issued to the remain-
London Mills. See Hamilton, supra note 46. Under the terms of that agreement, Pfizer
bought the twenty-two acres upon which its headquarters is situated for only $10. Id.
67. See Petitioners' Brief, supra note 21, at 5-6.
68. See id. at 6.
69. Id.
70. See Mansnerus, supra note 17.
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. By December 2000, the NLDC had "bought 65 properties in the 90-acre neighbor-
hood." Herszenhorn, supra note 19. The MDP called for the acquisition of a total of eighty-
five homes and businesses. Budoff, supra note 3.
74. Herszenhorn, supra note 19; Mansnerus, supra note 5.
75. See Herszenhorn, supra note 19.
"We do not want to sell," said Michael Cristofaro, 38, a computer technician,
whose parents own a home at 53 Goshen Street that the family says is worth
about $200,000. "The property has been in our family for the last 36 years.
They could come in here and offer us $500,000 for it and we wouldn't take it.
It's really not the money issue. It's the principle of it."
Id.
76. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 21, at 6. When the New London City Council author-
ized the Fort Trumbull property acquisitions in January 2000, the Council delegated its
1288 [Vol. 39:1279
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ing Fort Trumbull residents. 7 Mrs. Kelo, whose notice was nailed
to her front door, received hers on the day before Thanksgiving
2000.78 According to its terms, Mrs. Kelo was no longer a private
homeowner, but was required to pay rent to the NLDC if she con-
tinued to occupy her residence.79 The following November, the
NLDC initiated formal condemnation actions against the resi-
dents to whom notices were issued. 0
In response, the residents filed an eight-count complaint in
Connecticut Superior Court against the NLDC, seeking to enjoin
the development corporation from proceeding with its condemna-
tions.8" After a seven-day trial, the court granted permanent in-
junctive relief in favor of several plaintiffs 2 and temporary in-
junctions for others.8 3 For the plaintiffs who received permanent
injunctions, the constitutional application of public use drove the
court's decision. 4 In the court's estimation, public use was not an
interest reserved exclusively by governments to excuse the sei-
zure of citizens' private property; the public also had a constitu-
tionally protected interest in having security in their property.8
On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of Connecticut re-
versed the judgment of the trial court with respect to the perma-
nent injunctions, holding that New London's condemnations were
reasonable in spite of the fact that the city had not yet committed
to specific development plans.86 This decision prompted a dissent
authority to exercise eminent domain to the NLDC. Id.
77. See Mansnerus, supra note 5.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Respondents' Brief, supra note 9, at 9.
81. Id.; see also Kelo v. City of New London, No. 557299, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS
789, at *1-2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002) ("[T]he plaintiffs ... seek injunctive relief to
prevent the taking of their homes by eminent domain.").
82. Kelo, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 789, at *265, 341. The plaintiffs who received per-
manent injunctions were those whose properties were situated on parcel 4A. Id. at *341.
At the time of trial, the NLDC had failed to advance a sufficiently specific intended use for
that property that would have justified their condemnations. Id. at *231-66.
83. Id. at *341. These injunctions were granted during the pendency of appeal for the
owners of properties situated in parcel 3, which was intended for research and develop-
ment office space. Respondents' Brief, supra note 9, at 7.
84. Kelo, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 789, at *336.
85. Id.
86. Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 573-74 (Conn. 2004).
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criticizing the majority for establishing what was facetiously-but
perhaps appropriately-termed the "Field of Dreams" test:17
[Ihf the enabling statute is constitutional, if the plan of development
is drawn in good faith and if the plan merely states that there are
economic benefits to be realized, that is enough. Thus, the test is
premised on the concept that "if you build it, [they] will come," and
fails to protect adequately the rights of private property owners.
8 8
From this decision the Fort Trumbull residents appealed their
cause to the Supreme Court of the United States. 9 Granting cer-
tiorari,9 ° the Court resolved to set forth what protection under the
Fifth Amendment-if any-is due "for individuals whose property
is being condemned, not to eliminate slums or blight, but for the
sole purpose of 'economic development.' 91
B. New London is Not Alone
The residents of Fort Trumbull are certainly not the first to
face eviction through an exercise of eminent domain for the pur-
pose of economic development; they are only among the latest in a
widespread practice that has spanned the past half-century.92 Ac-
cording to the Institute for Justice, a Washington-based civil lib-
erties law firm that monitors exercises of eminent domain na-
tionwide, there were more than 10,000 actual or threatened
private-to-private93 condemnations in the United States between
1998 and 2002. 9" This figure represents only the number of such
87. Id. at 602 (Zarella, J., dissenting).
88. Id. (Zarella, J., dissenting) (second alteration in original).
89. See Petitioners' Brief, supra note 21, at 9.
90. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004), cert. granted (No. 04-108).
91. Supreme Court of the United States, Granted & Noted List, October Term 2004
(Sept. 28, 2004), at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/04-00108qp.pdf (last visited Apr. 2,
2005).
92. The modern practice of using eminent domain as a means of economic develop-
ment first vested in 1954 with Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), which is discussed
more thoroughly below in Part III.C.1.
93. "Private-to-private condemnation" describes the situation where the private prop-
erty of one landowner is condemned by his government so that it may then be either used
by or conveyed to another private citizen, be that citizen a natural person or a corporate
entity.
94. BERLINER, supra note 16, at 2. As part of its mission, the Institute for Justice also
represents citizens facing private-to-private condemnation. Id. at 9. In fact, the Institute
argued on behalf of Mrs. Kelo and the other Fort Trumbull residents before the Supreme
Court. For more information about the Institute for Justice or its representative clients,
see the organization's website at http://www.ij.org.
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condemnations that were reported, and the Institute cautions
that the actual figure could be much higher.95 For example, of all
fifty states, Connecticut alone records the number of eminent
domain condemnation actions filed in its courts.96 During the five-
year study period, Connecticut recorded 543 redevelopment con-
demnations." When the Institute researched the number of times
Connecticut redevelopment condemnations were mentioned in the
state's newspapers, however, there were only thirty-one.98
Regardless of the actual number of redevelopment condemna-
tions, there can be no doubt that the practice is widespread. In
Lakewood, Ohio, for example, the city government attempted to
condemn an entire neighborhood of single-family homes-fifty-
five in all-to make way for luxury condominiums and an upscale
mall.99 The houses proposed for condemnation in Lakewood were
neither ramshackle nor run-down. Instead, they were colonial-
style homes located in an area known as Scenic Park, a commu-
nity that was more than a century old.1°° The residents of Scenic
Park were informed by their municipal government, though, that
their homes were "blighted"-a term describing residences that
lacked three bedrooms, two bathrooms, an attached three-car ga-
rage, or central air conditioning.0 1 At a town hall meeting con-
cerning the redevelopment, Scenic Park residents pointed out
that none of the homes of the council members could satisfy the
statutory criteria by which they had unanimously-and appar-
ently hypocritically-resolved to condemn Scenic Park.10 2 In an
attempt to justify Scenic Park's designation, Lakewood Mayor
Madeleine Cain explained that blighted was only a statutory
term; and that the true "'question [was] whether or not [Scenic
Park could] be used for a higher and better use.""' 3
95. BERLINER, supra note 16, at 9.
96. Id. at 2.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 60 Minutes, supra note 2.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. The City of Lakewood was never able to determine whether Scenic Park could
be put to a higher and better use, though. In a 2003 referendum, Lakewood voters not only
rescinded the blighted designation applied against Scenic Park, but also rejected the de-
velopment plan that would have necessitated that neighborhood's condemnation. Institute
for Justice, Saleet v. City of Lakewood: IJ Defeats Eminent Domain Abuse in Lakewood,
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That was precisely the same question that the City Council of
Mesa, Arizona asked with respect to Bailey's Brake Service.
Randy Bailey was the owner of Bailey's Brake Service, a business
that he inherited from his father. °4 Bailey's Brake was situated
in downtown Mesa at one of the city's busiest intersections.0 5 In
1998, the Mesa City Council unveiled its strategy to revitalize the
downtown area, a plan that predictably entailed the redevelop-
ment of occupied real estate into more profitable uses.0 6 Seizing
upon the opportunity to build a bigger store at the city's expense,
the owner of another local business convinced the city council to
condemn Bailey's Brake, as well as several adjoining properties,
and to convey the land to him.0 7 The council was happy to oblige
and began buying out Mr. Bailey's neighbors.' 8 Mr. Bailey tried
to negotiate a solution that would allow him to keep his family
business in its present location, but these efforts were made in
vain.'0 9 In a 60 Minutes interview, the owner of the business that
wanted to relocate displayed little concern for petitioning the city
to condemn Mr. Bailey's property. "'It happens all over the coun-
try. In practically any town you want to go to, they're redevelop-
ing their town centers.""'1 "Redevelopment to me," Mr. Bailey
remarked, "'means [you] work with existing people who are
there .... If I'd had a "For Sale" sign out there, it would have
been a whole different deal .... It doesn't even sound like the
United States."""
For the past several decades, though, condemnations like these
have been common practice in American cities."2 But this has not
Ohio, at http://www.ij.org/private-property/lakewood/index.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
104. BERLINER, supra note 16, at 16.
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. See 60 Minutes, supra note 2.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. Bailey's Brake Service escaped condemnation. See Bailey v. Myers, 76 P.3d
898, 899 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). The Arizona Court of Appeals held that Mesa's reliance on
eminent domain was not justified in this circumstance, as condemning one privately
owned business so that the property upon which it was situated could be transferred to
another was not a public use within the meaning of the constitution. Id. at 904.
112. The modern era of eminent domain began with the Supreme Court's decision in
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). Since that time, a number of state courts have had
the opportunity to determine to what extent eminent domain may be exercised within
their respective jurisdictions. Seven states presently allow condemnations of private prop-
erty to serve purposes related to economic development, such as increasing tax revenue
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always been the case. As the next section will explain, the power
of eminent domain throughout history has been narrowly con-
fined to circumstances in which the public utility of a condemna-
tion has been fairly apparent. Indeed, for much of America's po-
litical history, condemnations of private property for economic
redevelopment would doubtless have been considered flatly re-
pugnant to the Constitution. The following section will explore
the philosophical and historical foundations of eminent domain in
an attempt to track the route by which Kelo came to be presented
before the Supreme Court of the United States.
III. COMING TO KELO: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF
EMINENT DOMAIN
A. Property Ownership as the Basis of a Durable Society
The proposition that respect for private property is essential to
the integrity of durable societies is beyond question. Without a
general distribution of wealth and the means of its production,
the capacity of society to support essential social functions would
be grievously impaired.113 Were wealth concentrated in the hands
of the state, individuals existing under such a regime would live
permanently at their government's discretion. With this concern
in mind, James Madison warned that "[wihere an excess of power
prevails, property of no sort is duly respected." '14 Just as an ex-
cess of power imposes grave dangers to the durability of society,
though, so too does an excess of liberty."5 In the event of either
and creating job opportunities: Connecticut, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
New York, and North Dakota. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 12, Kelo v. City of New
London, _ U.S. _ (2005) (No. 04-108). Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine,
Montana, South Carolina, and Washington have affirmatively declared that economic de-
velopment alone is not a sufficient public use that can justify condemning private prop-
erty. Id. at 13. In addition, Delaware, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts have all indi-
cated that, if confronted with the question, they would also decline to recognize public use
as a sufficiently compelling reason to condemn private property. Id. at 14. The remaining
thirty-two states fall, by inference, somewhere in the middle.
113. See generally Loren A. Smith, Life, Liberty & Whose Property?: An Essay on Prop-
erty Rights, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1055, 1060 (1996) ("Underlying all of our political and in-
tellectual freedoms which make for a civilized society is a foundation of widely dispersed
private property ... ").
114. James Madison, Property, NAT'L GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, reprinted in 6 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 101 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
115. See id.
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circumstance, Madison predicted that "[nlo man (would be] safe
in his opinions, his person, his faculties or his possessions."116
Government's role with respect to private property should there-
fore be to accord it maximum protection without engendering an
effective transfer of control from the citizen to the state.
To be certain, government's obligation with respect to the pro-
tection of private property is not discretionary; it is obligatory. In
John Locke's estimation, property-which included an individ-
ual's life, liberty, and estate"' 7-is the foundation of society.1 '
Prior to the formation of societies, these three aspects of property
exist solely at the discretion of each individual. Property is there-
fore not a privilege granted by the state to individuals; it is a
right that exists apart from society and, indeed, exists before soci-
ety.119
For Locke, this describes the "state of nature," a condition in
which all are equal and everyone sovereign. 2 ° The state of nature
may sound utopian, but consistent with Madison's warning,
Locke envisions the natural world in which there is an excess of
liberty as one "full of fears and continual dangers;" "the enjoy-
ment of the property.., in this state is very unsafe, very unse-
cure." 2' To escape the fear and insecurity engendered by living at
complete liberty, individuals unite for their common welfare and
defense. 22 In exchange, a substantial portion of their natural lib-
erty is surrendered to society. With the authority ceded from its
constituent members, the society may then accomplish the pur-
pose for which it was created-providing a refuge from continual
fear and danger through its operative force, the government.'23
116. Id.
117. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 71 (Thomas P. Peardon ed.,
Prentice-Hall 1952) (1690).
118. See id.
119. This describes the very relationship between the individual and property that
courses through America's political heritage. See, e.g., Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (1795). "The constitution expressly declares, that the right of acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property is natural, inherent, and unalienable. It is a right not
ex gratia from the legislature, but ex debito from the constitution." Id. at 311.
120. See LOCKE, supra note 117, at 70.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 70-71.
123. This relationship between individuals and their government is clearly reflected in
the preamble to the United States Constitution:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, es-
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To summarize Locke's argument, "[t]he great and chief end...
of men's uniting into commonwealths and putting themselves un-
der government is the preservation of their property." 24 Properly
limited, then, government's mandate should be conceived as co-
terminous with the amount of liberty individuals have ceded to
society for the preservation of their property-and no further. 
25
B. A Brief Discussion of the Historical Development of Eminent
Domain
Although the term "eminent domain" was not coined until the
seventeenth century,126 the power of the state to take privately
owned property for public uses had already been firmly estab-
lished for millennia. 27 It was not until the decline of the English
feudal system, however, that eminent domain became a matter of
pressing legal concern. 2' As the ownership of private property
passed from the Crown to its subjects, laws developed that regu-
tablish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United
States of America.
U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added).
124. LOCKE, supra note 117, at 71.
125. In fairness, it should be noted that Locke was not absolutely against the power of
government to take private land. Although he strictly maintained that legitimate govern-
ments must first receive the consent of the owner before taking his property, Locke rea-
soned that, in a representative government, the owner's elected representative to the leg-
islature may properly consent to the taking. See 13 POWELL, supra note 10, §
79F.01[1][a] [ii], at 79F-9. This, however, should not be considered as Locke's absolution of
eminent domain. Instead, Locke recognized a great danger in legislatures whose members
had become so comfrtable in their positions that they would develop ideas of what served
the public good distinct from what was actually in society's best interests. See LOCKE, su-
pra note 117, at 79. A legislature should be variable, rather than in continuous session,
and its members should have to return to the community and exist under the laws they
enact. Id. The problem with eminent domain, of course, is that those who serve in the leg-
islature are most likely those whose land is safe from condemnation.
126. The Dutch political philosopher Grotius is widely credited with coining the term
"eminent domain" in De Jure Belli et Pacis (Concerning the Law of War and Peace). E.g.,
Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203,
204 (1978).
127. It is generally accepted that the power of eminent domain dates to at least the era
of the Roman Empire. See, e.g., id. ("The right of the sovereign to condemn private prop-
erty dates back at least to the ancient Romans."). But see 13 POWELL, supra note 10, §
79F.01[1] [a], at 79F-7 ("Historians of the law of eminent domain have been interested in
Roman practice, but not much good historical evidence exists concerning the Roman law of
land expropriation.").
128. 13 POWELL, supra note 10, § 79F.01[1][a], at 79F-7 to 79F-8.
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lated the balance of power between individuals and their govern-
ment. 129 First among these was the Magna Charta, which pro-
vided, among other things, that the King could not even take tim-
ber from a citizen's land without the owner's consent.'3 ° He could
only "make use of but not take ownership of private land in the
areas of his prerogative-for example, navigation, foreign affairs,
defense, and law enforcement-all without payment of compensa-
tion."131 Nor could the King wield the power of expropriation ex-
clusively.132 Parliament could take ownership of private property,
but only after fairly compensating the property owner. 133
As the laws of a government follow its flag, so the American
colonies-and later, the several states-received the legal tradi-
tions of Great Britain. 134 From its first exercises in the fledgling
Republic, eminent domain was a despised power. In one of the
earliest cases to reach the Supreme Court of the United States
regarding the federal government's ability to take private prop-
erty, Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance,13' eminent domain was slan-
dered as "the despotic power," though it was reluctantly conceded
that "the existence of [eminent domain] is necessary" and that
"government could not subsist without it."1 36 The Court supposed,
however, that Congress would not exercise its power of eminent
domain "except in urgent cases, or cases of the first necessity.'
37
"Singular, indeed, and untoward must be the state of things,
that would induce the Legislature. . . to divest one individual
of his landed estate merely for the purpose of vesting it in an-
other .. ."138 In fact, the Court admitted to finding it "difficult to
129. See id. § 79F.01[1] [a] [i], at 79F-8.
130. Id.
131. Berger, supra note 126, at 204.
132. See 13 POWELL, supra note 10, § 79F.01[11[a][i], at 79F-8 ("[N]o Freeman shall...
be desseized of his Freehold... but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the
Land.") (quoting MAGNA CHARTA, ch. XXIX).
133. See Berger, supra note 126, at 204.
134. See generally 13 POWELL, supra note 10, § 79F.011l] [a] [iii], at 79F-10 to 79F-11.
135. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (1795). In Vanhorne's Lessee, two groups of settlers--one from
Connecticut and one from Pennsylvania-had each established a claim to the same acre-
age at a time before the formation of the Republic when the boundaries among colonies
were not clearly defined. One deed was received from Native Americans, the other from
William Penn. Both groups of settlers subsequently passed title to different purchasers,
who then sought to establish their own respective paramount rights to the property. Id. at
304-05.
136. Id. at 311.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 312.
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form a case, in which the necessity of a state can be of such a na-
ture, as to authorise or excuse the seizing of landed property be-
longing to one citizen, and giving it to another citizen."'39 Waxing
poetic on the integrity of property in the new Republic, the Court
concluded that "It]he constitution encircles, and renders [property
a] holy thing .... It is sacred." 4 °
In the original estimation of the Supreme Court, then, it is
clear that proper exercises of eminent domain were to be confined
to urgent matters of public necessity. What issues constituted
matters of public necessity remained within Congress's exclusive
discretion.' With respect to takings of private property in which
the property seized was to be subsequently transferred to another
private citizen, however, the Court found this constitutionally in-
conceivable.142
The integrity of this formulation of eminent domain appears to
have remained intact through the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, though it was slightly enlarged in 1916 with the Supreme
Court's decision in Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Company
v. Alabama Interstate Power Company.' In Cotton Duck, a state-
licensed power company had initiated a condemnation action
against land on which it wanted to construct a power plant.
144
Cotton Duck opposed the condemnation, objecting on the grounds
that this exercise of eminent domain did not entail a public use of
the property; the power company was not a governmental entity,
139. Id. at 311 (emphasis added).
140. Id.
141. "[Tlhe Legislature are [sic] the sole and exclusive judges of the necessity of the
case, in which this despotic power should be called into action." Id. at 312.
142. Based on these principles, the original test for the propriety of an exercise of emi-
nent domain seemingly consisted of two parts. First, the court would inquire into whether
the property seized is for public use-and not the broader classification of public utility.
This distinction is subtle, but important. To use a modern example, a shopping center may
have public utility, but it is not for public use in a sense consistent with Vanhorne's Lessee.
Vanhorne's Lessee draws a clear distinction between public and private entities, and can-
didly asserts disapproval for the state's forced transfer of private property to another pri-
vate-nongovernmental-individual. See id. at 314-15. And so it seems that, to satisfy the
first requisite of permissibility under Vanhorne's Lessee, the governing authority that con-
demned an individual's private property would actually have to occupy it. The second req-
uisite appears to be the satisfaction of an inquiry into the necessity of the condemnation.
See id. at 315-16. Given the judiciary's well-founded reluctance to second-guess coordinate
branches of government, though, this second inquiry creates nothing more than a rebut-
table presumption in favor of the condemning authority.
143. 240 U.S. 30 (1916).
144. The State of Alabama had apparently delegated authority to the power company
to condemn property necessary for the plant's construction. Id. at 31-32.
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nor would the public physically use the premises.145 Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court upheld the propriety of the condemnation.
Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, stated:
In the organic relations of modem society it may sometimes be hard
to draw the line that is supposed to limit the authority of the legisla-
ture to exercise or delegate the power of eminent domain. But to
gather the streams from waste and to draw from them energy, labor
without brains, and so to save mankind from toil that it can be
spared, is to supply what, next to intellect, is the very foundation of
all our achievements and all our welfare. If that purpose is not public
we should be at a loss to say what is. The inadequacy of use by the
general public as a universal test is established.
14 6
Cotton Duck thus expanded the permissible scope of public uses
to include not only actual governmental use, but also private use
when the public was the clear beneficiary of the condemnation.
Condemnations were still impermissible, however, where the
public utility of the seizure was either too attenuated or simply
insufficient.147
C. Modern Developments in the Exercise of Eminent Domain
Justice Patterson, author of Vanhorne's Lessee, cautioned a-
gainst expansive interpretation of the Constitution. "Innovation
145. Id. at 32.
146. Id. (emphasis added).
147. As late as 1937, the Supreme Court had maintained the status of its eminent do-
main jurisprudence as set forth in Cotton Duck. "[Tihis Court has many times warned that
one person's property may not be taken for the benefit of another private person without a
justifying public purpose. . . ." Thompson v. Consol. Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80
(1937) (emphasis added).
During the first 150 years of the Republic's existence, the definition of "public use" oscil-
lated between narrow and broad formulations. E.g., 13 POWELL, supra note 10, §
79F.03[3] [a]-[b], at 79F-27 to 79F-32. Under the narrow formulation, public use literally
meant that the property must be used by the public, or that the public must have the op-
portunity to use the property taken. Kelo v. City of New London, No. 557299, 2002 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 789, at *77 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002). The broad formulation of pub-
lic use meant simply that the condemnation engendered some public advantage. Id. Al-
though the Court had wavered in the past regarding the interpretation-whether broad or
narrow-it would accord public use, Cotton Duck heralded its acceptance of the broad
view. 13 POWELL, supra note 10, § 79F.03[3][b][i]-[ii], at 79F-29 to 79F-30. Since that
time, the broad interpretation has only become broader. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26, 33 (1954) (holding that it was within Congress's power to consider health and aesthetic
values when enacting redevelopment legislation); see also Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff,
467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984) (holding that state legislatures are as competent as Congress to
make eminent domain determinations).
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is dangerous. One incroachment leads to another; precedent gives
birth to precedent; what has been done may be done again; thus
radical principles are generally broken in upon, and the constitu-
tion eventually destroyed."14 The previous section discussed the
original meaning of "public use" in the context of governmental
takings and outlined the adjustments-though minor-that were
made to that conception. For more than a century and a half, the
integrity of that framework persisted; government could constitu-
tionally take private property either for its own use, or for trans-
fer to another private individual when the property would be used
to directly benefit the general public. The scope of eminent do-
main did not remain static, though, and in 1954 it underwent a
dramatic expansion.
1. Berman v. Parker149
After World War II, Congress resolved to redevelop Washing-
ton, D.C. into a model city, declaring that it was "to be the policy
of the United States to protect and promote the welfare of the in-
habitants of the seat of the Government by eliminating ... injuri-
ous conditions" such as "substandard housing," "blighted areas,"
and the practice of using "buildings in alleys as dwellings for hu-
man habitation."' Finding all these social ills offensive to the
public health, welfare, safety, and morals, Congress determined
to improve the city's plight "by employing all means necessary
and appropriate for the purpose" of redevelopment.' Congress
further found that the extent of the injurious conditions was so
widespread as to preclude a solution through the natural opera-
tion of private enterprise alone.'52 The success of Washington's
redevelopment efforts would therefore hinge upon a great degree
of governmental participation.5 3 To that end, Congress declared
"the acquisition and the assembly of real property and the leasing
148. Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 311-12 (1795).
149. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
150. District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, ch. 736, § 2, 60 Stat. 790, 790
(1946).
151. Id. Congress is of course the principal and exclusive governing organization in the
District of Columbia, and is so by the explicit language of the Constitution. U.S. CONST.
art. I., § 8, cl. 17.
152. District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945 § 2.
153. Id.
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or sale thereof for redevelopment.., to be a public use."'54 Once
enough realty had been acquired, the land would then be trans-
ferred to public agencies for the construction of streets, schools,
utilities, and recreational facilities.155 Any real estate remaining
after distribution to public agencies could then be leased or sold
to private individuals or corporations.'56
Plans were soon drafted and adopted that designated certain
areas of Washington as priorities for redevelopment.157 Private
properties situated in certain designated areas were condemned,
their owners paid fair market value for their loss, and the titles to
the lands transferred to the government.' Naturally, the prop-
erty owners-of which Berman was one-objected to this forced
sale, and in Berman v. Parker appealed their cause to the Su-
preme Court of the United States.'59
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed Con-
gress's exercise of eminent domain. 6 ° The Court began its analy-
sis by considering the extent of Congress's regulatory power over
Washington, D.C., concluding that the scope of its authority "in-
cludes all the legislative powers which a state may exercise over
its affairs.... [It is] what traditionally has been known as the po-
lice power."' 6 ' Though the full extent of the authority bound
within Congress's police powers went largely undefined, the
Court offered public safety, public health, morality, peace and
quiet, and law and order as among "the more conspicuous exam-
ples" of its permissible exercise. 62 From this proposition the
Court reasoned that legislatures are better suited to serve the
public's needs through social legislation than the judiciary, which
must therefore defer to the discretion of legislatures when acting
pursuant to a valid exercise of the legislature's police powers.' 63
The Court's inquiry then moved to consider whether Congress's
condemnations fell within the scope of its police power, for if the
154. Id.
155. Id. § 7(a).
156. Id. § 7(b), (f).
157. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 30-31 (1954).
158. See generally id. at 36.
159. Id. at 28.
160. Id. at 36.
161. Id. at 31-32.
162. Id. at 32.
163. Id.
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condemnations were "within the authority of Congress, the right
to realize [the property] through the exercise of eminent domain
[would be] clear."'64 Approaching its analysis with due deference
to Congress's legislative determinations, the Court had little
trouble justifying the condemnations as an exercise of the tradi-
tional police power. "Miserable and disreputable housing condi-
tions may... spread disease and crime and immorality."'65 Under
such conditions, then, legislatures are fully justified in condemn-
ing blighted property.'66
Although at this point in the analysis the Court had justified
Congress's condemnation of blighted property, it had not yet up-
held the condemnation of the petitioner's property. Berman was a
business owner whose store was located in one of the most
blighted areas of Washington.'67 Though the area surrounding his
business was a slum, Berman contended that his individual prop-
erty was not blighted. 6 ' As a result, condemning his upstanding
business and the property on which it set not only failed to serve
a public interest, but also defied the public conscience.'69
The Court circumvented considering whether Berman's busi-
ness was sufficiently blighted by declaring, without precedent or
analysis, that "[piroperty may of course be taken.., which,
standing by itself, is innocuous and unoffending.... If owner af-
ter owner were permitted to resist these redevelopment programs
on the ground that his particular property was not being used
against the public interest, integrated plans for redevelopment
would suffer greatly."7 °
The precedent Berman established was both multifaceted and
sweeping. First, the definition of "public use" as set forth in the
Fifth Amendment was no longer limited to merely actual gov-
ernmental use or uses benefiting the public directly. The defini-
tion had now swelled to include legislative actions occurring
within the scope of the condemning authority's police power.' 7 '
164. Id. at 33.
165. Id. at 32.
166. See id. at 33.
167. See id. at 30-31.
168. Id. at 31.
169. See id.
170. Id. at 35.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 143-47.
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Second, as the judiciary would pay great deference to legislative
determinations, the Court would consider its role in determining
whether the legislature properly had exercised its police power
"an extremely narrow one."'72 Third, and relatedly, the rights of
the individual with respect to his private property had been un-
equivocally subjugated to any rational public interest the state
may have in that property.' 73 In short, the private estate of an in-
dividual was no longer "holy," "sacred," or "inviolable" as Justice
Patterson proclaimed;174 rather, Berman established the proposi-
tion that the only property safe from condemnation is that which
has no public utility. 175 "The rights of [the] property owners are
satisfied when they receive that just compensation which the
Fifth Amendment exacts as the price of the taking."
176
2. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff 7
Thirty years after Berman, the Supreme Court once again had
the opportunity to consider the scope of eminent domain, though
in a context different from urban redevelopment. Prior to Ha-
waii's admission as a state in 1959, private ownership of Hawai-
ian property was nearly nonexistent.'78 Since Hawaii's first colo-
nization by Polynesian settlers, the islands had existed under a
high chieftain who controlled all dispositions of property and es-
sentially held Hawaii's land in trust for all its citizens. 179 Once
172. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
173. In Berman, for example, the Court makes this plainly clear: "If owner after owner
were permitted to resist these redevelopment programs on the ground that his particular
property was not being used against the public interest, integrated plans for redevelop-
ment would suffer greatly.... [Clommunity redevelopment programs need not, by force of
the Constitution, be on a piecemeal basis." Id. at 35.
174. Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 311, 314 (1795).
175. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 6-7, Kelo v. City of New London, -
U.S. - (2005) (No. 04-108).
[Eiconomic development condemnations can occur in any area, as long as the
city can conceive of a possibly more profitable use of the property that might
therefore produce more tax dollars. Any home can be condemned because few
if any homes generate as much tax revenue or as many jobs as an office build-
ing; any small or medium-sized business can be condemned because the land
will always produce more taxes as a larger business.
Id.
176. Berman, 348 U.S. at 36 (emphasis added).
177. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
178. Id. at 232.
179. Id.
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Hawaii attained statehood, its monarchy was permanently dis-
solved, though Hawaii's historical pattern of land occupancy per-
sisted.' ° A study commissioned by the Hawaii Legislature found
that most of the state's land was owned by a small number of
very wealthy landowners.18 ' The effect of having so much of the
state's land concentrated in the hands of so few had artificially in-
flated the price of realty; Hawaii's citizens, rather than owning
property, had little choice but to lease land from these landhold-
ers. 82 To remedy this undesirable social condition, Hawaii pro-
posed to break up the oligopoly of land ownership and allow for
property to be publicly distributed at its fair market value
through the state's use of eminent domain-an action to which
the landholders strongly objected.8 3
The Supreme Court began its analysis of Midkiff with Berman,
inquiring whether Hawaii's plan for land redistribution fell
within the scope of the state's traditional police powers and
thereby served a legitimate public interest. 8 4 The answer to this
was in the affirmative. "Regulating oligopoly and the evils associ-
ated with it is a classic exercise of a State's police powers ""'-
doubtless for its protection and promotion of society's general wel-
fare. The Court next considered whether Hawaii's means of exer-
cising eminent domain were rational.8 6 Finding the process em-
ployed by the state to be both comprehensive and reasonable, this
too was upheld. 8 7 "When the legislature's purpose is legitimate
and its means are not irrational," the exercise of eminent domain
satisfies the requirements of the Fifth Amendment, and takings
such as Hawaii's are deemed constitutionally permissible. 88
Midkiffs significance to the development of the modern doc-
trine of eminent domain is in its confirmation of the extensive
180. Id.
181. Id. The degree of concentration was severe. Forty-nine percent of Hawaii's land
was classified as government property, either state or federal. Forty-seven percent of the
state's remaining land belonged to only seventy-two private landowners, leaving just four
percent of the state for other private ownership. With respect to the seventy-two large-
landholders, eighteen owned 21,000 acres or more. Id.
182. Id. at 232-33.
183. Id. at 233.
184. Id. at 239-42.
185. Id. at 242.
186. Id. at 242-43.
187. Id. at 243.
188. Id. at 242-43.
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latitude granted to legislatures as recognized in Berman. Indeed,
the Court plainly states that the public use requirement of the
Fifth Amendment is "coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's
police powers. " "' Midkiff also more clearly illustrates the due
process analysis in which the Court engages in testing the valid-
ity of a challenged exercise of eminent domain. The Court will
first assess whether the stated purpose of a proposed condemna-
tion is within the reasonable ambit of the condemning authority's
police power. 9 ° Consistent with Berman, though, the condemning
authority's action is entitled to a strong degree of deference and is
therefore presumptively valid. 9' Should the condemning author-
ity satisfy the first criterion, the second inquiry moves to examine
whether the condemnation is a rational means of achieving the
stated public interest implicated in the condemnation. 192 This,
too, is subject to great deference.' 93
An individual whose property is facing condemnation may cer-
tainly feel as though the deck is stacked against him. With great
deference extended to legislatures out of respect for the separa-
tion of powers, the individual property owner is left to face a
mountain of adverse presumptions with no assistance from the
judiciary. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority in Midkiff,
stated that there remains "a role for courts to play in reviewing a
legislature's judgment of what constitutes a public use, even
when the eminent domain power is equated with the police
power."' 94 To date, however, that role has consisted of little more
than a rubber stamp approving condemnations of private prop-
erty.
D. Revolution and Counter-Revolution in the States
At the same time that the federal government was endorsing
the broad application of public use as a matter of constitutional
189. Id. at 240. "Evidently, the Court meant that any of the purposes served by the po-
lice power (safety, health, morals and general welfare) may also be attained at the election
of the sovereign by use of the power of eminent domain." 13 POWELL, supra note 10, §
79F.03[3] [b] [iii], at 79F-32.
190. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240.
191. Id. at 240-41.
192. Id. at 241.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 240.
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interpretation, many states were following suit within their own
jurisdictions. In Michigan, the supreme court held that the con-
demnation of private homes for the construction of an automotive
manufacturing facility was a justifiable public use, because eco-
nomic welfare-and by connection, job creation-was a matter of
public interest traditionally entrusted to the protection of the
state.'95 While condemnations of real estate for economic devel-
opment are rather commonplace in modern America,'9 6 eminent
domain may also be exercised over intangible personal prop-
erty.'97 In California, for example, the City of Oakland legiti-
mately condemned the trademark for the Oakland Raiders after
the franchise threatened to relocate to another city.' Expansive
interpretations of what constitutes public use are therefore not
relegated strictly to the federal judiciary, but have over time
emerged as a national phenomenon.
This is not to say, however, that courts of the several states
have uniformly adopted the broad formulation of public use. To
the contrary, the pendulum of public use in many states is swing-
ing back toward the narrow construction. 99 As a consequence,
there is presently no consensus on what the constitutional defini-
tion of public use is.2°
195. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 459 (Mich.
1981) (per curiam). This precedent was recently overturned, however, in County of Wayne
v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004), signaling a constriction in Michigan of the
meaning of public use.
196. See generally BERLINER, supra note 16, at 3 ("Eminent domain for private use
happens all over the country, and local governments and developers regularly force resi-
dents and business out by threatening eminent domain.").
197. E.g., City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 840 (Cal. 1982).
198. Id. at 837. California's definition of public use as set forth in this decision is im-
mensely broad. "'It is not essential that the entire community, or even any considerable
portion thereof, shall directly enjoy or participate in an improvement in order to constitute
a public use.'" Id. at 841 (quoting Fallbrock Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 161-
62 (1896)).
199. E.g., Bailey v. Myers, 76 P.3d 898, 901 (Ariz. 2003) (holding that the condemna-
tion of a privately owned business for the purpose of redeveloping the property into other
privately owned businesses is not a legitimate exercise of eminent domain); Southwestern
Illinois Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1, 11 (Ill. 2002) ("The power of
eminent domain is to be exercised with restraint, not abandon."); Georgia Dep't of Transp.
v. Jasper County, 586 S.E.2d 853, 856 (S.C. 2003) ("'However attractive the proposed pro-
ject, however desirable the project from a government planning point of view, the use of
the power of eminent domain for such purposes runs squarely into the right of an individ-
ual to own property and use it as he pleases."') (quoting Karesh v. City Council of Charles-
ton, 247 S.E.2d 342, 345 (S.C. 1978)).
200. See generally Petitioners' Brief, supra note 21, at 10-20.
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IV. LOOKING AHEAD
A. Applying the Due Process Analysis to Kelo
Taken together, Berman and Midkiff establish the proposition
that governments at both the state and federal levels may legiti-
mately exercise their respective powers of eminent domain to
condemn a private individual's property if the purpose of the con-
demnation is rationally related to protecting or promoting the
health, welfare, safety, or morals of the public." 1 In the context of
urban renewal, these precedents have been commonly supposed
to provide municipal governments with the power to condemn
private property for "economic development"-a purpose which, if
valid, is almost certainly grounded in the welfare of the commu-
nity. Consistent with the due process analysis set forth in Ber-
man and Midkiff, then, Kelo may be reduced to two inquiries:
first, whether New London legitimately exercised its authority to
condemn the Fort Trumbull properties; and second, whether New
London's means in condemning the property were rationally re-
lated to its ends.
To the first inquiry-and assuming that the Supreme Court
applies no new standards-New London's decision to exercise
eminent domain to take the Fort Trumbull properties would very
likely be upheld. Consistent with Berman, a legislature need only
assert that the proposed taking will serve some public use by
promoting an interest protected within the scope of its police
powers.2' "[W]hen the legislature has spoken, the public interest
has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the
legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public
needs to be served by social legislation ... .203 In other words, an
exercise of eminent domain generally serves a legitimate public
purpose when the condemning authority says it does.20 4
201. See supra notes 171-73, 184-89 and accompanying text.
202. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
203. Id.
204. Though not entirely precluded from examining a legislature's relation of a con-
demnation to its purported public utility, "[tihe role of the judiciary in determining
whether [the condemnation] is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow
one." Id. Indeed, courts are directed to uphold a legislature's judgment "as to what consti-
tutes a public use 'unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation.'" Hawaii
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (quoting United States v. Gettysburg
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In Kelo, New London and the Connecticut legislature had both
declared that economic development was necessary to the city's
continued subsistence and prosperity and recognized that, with-
out immediate redevelopment, New London's prospects for a more
commercially vibrant future would continue to wane.205 In con-
trast to Berman, however, it was never contended that Fort
Trumbull was blighted,20 6 only that New London's economic vital-
ity depended upon its ability to attract commercial investment
and increase its annual tax revenue. 07 This, in turn, depended on
Fort Trumbull's wholesale condemnation and redevelopment.20 8 If
the Court's eminent domain jurisprudence holds steady and it
remains the case that governments need only demonstrate the ex-
istence of some rational relationship between a condemnation and
a matter of public interest, the constitutionality of New London's
condemnations will likely be recognized.
The Kelo decision is by no means a foregone conclusion, though.
The Court may very well find-as the Connecticut trial court
judge found 2 9 -that a rational relationship did not exist between
New London's condemnations and the purpose of those condem-
nations. Certainly, Fort Trumbull's condemnation will provide
the space necessary for New London's large-scale economic rede-
velopment, and to that end there is a relationship between the
condemnations and public welfare. 210 But is it a rational relation-
ship? Coursing through this inquiry is an undeniable irony. New
London's expressed purpose in condemning Fort Trumbull is eco-
nomic redevelopment, consisting of job creation and revenue gen-
eration, which will thereby ultimately serve the general public
welfare.211 What could be more destructive to the welfare of a peo-
Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896)).
205. See supra text accompanying notes 23-41.
206. Mansnerus, supra note 5.
207. See Respondents' Brief, supra note 9, at 1-3.
208. Id. at 6-8.
209. Under the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution, "no one's property can be
taken even if compensation is offered unless it is taken for a public use. Therefore, the de-
fendant government entities cannot make an exclusive claim to the public interest, the
public has recognized the interest the plaintiffs should have as of right in their property."
Kelo v. City of New London, No. 557299, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 789, at *336 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002) (emphasis added). The inference drawn by the court is that the
public use of a condemnation is rational insofar as it sufficiently outweighs society's gen-
eral interest in protecting the individual's security in his private property.
210. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 44-62 and accompanying text.
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ple, though, than to know that their government could foreclose
on their private homes and businesses at any moment, have them
condemned, and grant the land to another private citizen who can
make a more efficient use of the property than the present occu-
pant? As a consequence, while the promotion of the public's gen-
eral welfare is an interest that New London may legitimately pro-
tect pursuant to its police powers, it would be difficult to identify
the rational relationship between New London's means-evicting
citizens from their homes through condemnation-and its end-
economic development.
B. A Potential Solution: Striking a Balance Between Berman and
Kelo
In modern America, economic development and urban revitali-
zation are increasingly becoming essential to the maintenance of
212 thwell-managed cities and well-preserved greenspace. But the
exigencies of contemporary municipal planning and commercial
investment should not be so highly esteemed as to allow their ex-
ercise to disintegrate the fundamental social relationships among
the individual, his property, and his government that have de-
fined our Republic. The wisest decision is one that protects both
interests-that of the government in promoting public welfare
and that of the citizen in having security in his property. Kelo
provides a timely opportunity for striking a prudent balance be-
tween the two.
Indeed, Kelo's lasting legacy may very well be the establish-
ment of an eminent domain threshold, a point beyond which cer-
tain condemnations are held illegitimate. Although the basic
framework first set forth in Berman would continue to apply and
legislatures would still enjoy a great amount of judicial deference,
condemnations under a new analysis would be justified only if
there were a critical mass of public interests implicated. On one
side of the Kelo threshold-where condemnations in the public in-
terest are found legitimate-facts and circumstances similar to
Berman would exist. Legitimate condemnations would demand
more justification than mere economic redevelopment, implicat-
ing other aspects of the police power. On the other side of the
212. See generally URBAN PLANNING (Andrew I. Cavin ed., 2003).
[Vol. 39:12791308
THE KELO THRESHOLD
threshold, however, are facts similar to Kelo. A legitimate public
interest such as the generation of tax revenue may be at stake,
but on the whole the harm done to the security of individuals in
their private property outweighs the general public utility. To
satisfy the due process analysis under, this proposed framework,
the condemning authority would need to show that the rational
relationship between its condemnation and the public interest is
sufficiently compelling to prevail against the rights of a private
property owner.
There is every indication that the Supreme Court is prepared
to establish such a test. While the constitutionality of New Lon-
don's condemnations could be decided in either way, the mere fact
that certiorari was granted provides tremendous insight into how
the Court will approach the analysis in Kelo. After Berman and
Midkiff, the scope of power wielded by the government regarding
eminent domain is near plenary. If Kelo is decided in favor of New
London, then the current doctrine of eminent domain will be left
largely unchanged. Kelo, like Midkiff, would come to be known as
additional confirmation of the latitude granted to governments to
exercise their power of eminent domain. Audiences before the
Court, though, are rare and not granted without good cause.
While Kelo may prove to be nothing more than a rubber stamp on
existing government practices, it is more likely that Kelo will set
forth a new principle limiting the scope of legitimate governmen-
tal condemnations.213
Should the Supreme Court in fact establish a new test consis-
tent with the principles outlined above, New London's takings
would fail constitutional muster. New London has based much of
its justification on the fact that redevelopment will generate more
tax revenue.214 If such a justification were upheld, there would be
very little limit to what properties could be taken by the govern-
ment and for how insignificant of a purpose.21 While the addi-
tional tax revenue at stake in Kelo is several hundred thousand
213. Though the role of the judiciary in determining whether the power of eminent do-
main is being exercised for a public purpose is an "extremely narrow one," Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954), "Itlhere is, of course, a role for courts to play in reviewing a
legislature's judgment of what constitutes a public use, even when the eminent domain
power is equated with the police power." Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240
(1984).
214. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 21, at 2.
215. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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dollars, the next case to test such expansive limits may only be
several hundred dollars, perhaps even less. In contrast, the public
interest in protecting private property-though not insurmount-
able-must always be considered great. On balance, the harm
wrought against property security would seem more substantial
than the benefits rendered through the condemnations. Under
the threshold set forth above, New London's expropriation-and
those in similar fashion presently occurring across the United
States-would cease permanently.
V. CONCLUSION
Though the scope of the government's power to condemn the
property of individuals has waxed since the founding of the Re-
public, the centrality-and indeed, the necessity-of private
property to the maintenance of a durable society has remained
constant. In the past fifty years, Americans have witnessed a
steady erosion of their property rights, watching them slip before
their eyes into an unfathomable stream of public use. Certainly,
to be effective, both the federal and state governments must be
endowed with sufficient power to ensure the solvency of the Un-
ion. This requires the authority to regulate, within appropriate
jurisdictions, the health, welfare, safety, and morals of the con-
stituency. But government is due only a certain amount of lati-
tude, above and below which its power must not be allowed; for in
both excesses and abscesses, the power of the state can lead to
the destruction of fundamental rights. The modern trend has
been toward having an excess of power-of allowing governments
to take property in the public's name for what is essentially pri-
vate development. The dangers from the persistence of such a
trend are manifold; the benefits, few; the stakes, high. Under cur-
rent law, governments may exercise their powers of condemna-
tion to the fullest extent of their sovereign authority. It can only
be presumed that, by granting certiorari to Kelo, the Supreme
Court has every intention of refining the relationships among the
individual, his property, and his government by establishing a
threshold by which to test condemnations, and of reining in fu-
ture abuses of the despotic power of eminent domain.
Steven E. Buckingham
1310 [Vol. 39:1279
